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Moments of flux in intermediary liability for copyright 
infringement 
Nicolas Suzor, Rachel Choi, and Kylie Pappalardo 
Abstract: This chapter provides an overview of a recent shift in regulatory strategies to address 
copyright infringement toward enlisting the assistance of general purpose Internet Service Providers. In 
Australia, the High Court held in 2012 that iiNet, a general purpose ISP, had no legal duty to police 
what its subscribers did with their internet connections. We provide an overview of three recent 
developments in Australian copyright law since that decision that demonstrate an emerging shift in the 
way that obligations are imposed on ISPs to govern the actions of their users without relying on 
secondary liability. The first is a new privately negotiated industry code that introduces a 'graduated 
response' system that requires ISPs to pass on warnings to subscribers who receive allegations of 
infringement. The second involves a recent series of Federal Court cases where rightsholders made a 
partially successful application to require ISPs to hand over the identifying details of subscribers whose 
households are alleged to have infringed copyright. The third is a new legislative scheme that will 
require ISPs to block access to foreign websites that 'facilitate' infringement. We argue that these shifts 
represent a greater sophistication in approaches to enrolling general purpose intermediaries in the 
regulatory project. We also suggest that these shifts represent a potentially disturbing trend towards 
enforcement of copyright law in a way that does not provide strong safeguards for the legitimate 
constitutional due process interests of users. We conclude with a call for greater attention and research 
to better understand how intermediaries make decisions when governing the conduct of users, how those 
decisions may be influenced by both state and non-state actors, and how the rights of individuals to due 
process can be adequately protected. 
 
 
"Technology creates new intermediaries, and changes what it's possible to require of them."1 
 
Regulating the internet is hard to do. The scale of the internet, its transnational nature, and the anonymity of users 
make it extremely costly to target the individuals who breach national civil or criminal laws. The only effective 
and scalable way to regulate the actions of large numbers people on the internet is through online intermediaries.2 
These are the institutions that facilitate communication: internet service providers ('ISPs'), search engines, content 
hosts, and social networks. Governments, private firms, and civil society organisations are increasingly seeking to 
compel these intermediaries to take more responsibility to prevent or respond to infringements of intellectual 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
1 Cory Doctorow, Information Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Laws for the Internet Age (McSweeney’s, 2014) 
70. 
2 Jack L Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford 
University Press US, 2006). 
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property (‘IP’) rights (particularly copyright and trademark). Around the world, intermediaries are increasingly 
subject to a variety of obligations to help enforce IP rights, ranging from informal social and governmental 
pressure, to industry codes and private negotiated agreements, to formal legislative schemes.3 This chapter 
provides an example of this emerging shift toward increased responsibilities for intermediaries, through 
examination of a series of recent developments in Australian copyright law. We review recent changes to the law 
that propose to require general purpose ISPs to pass on warning notices and allegations of infringement to their 
subscribers, to hand details of subscribers who have received allegations of infringement over to rightsholders, 
and to attempt to block access to foreign websites that 'facilitate' infringement. These changes represent a stark 
policy move away from the 2012 Roadshow Films v iiNet decision, where the Australian High Court held that a 
general purpose ISP had no legal duty to concern itself with what its subscribers did with their internet 
connections.4 The full impact of these recent changes is not yet knowable. Taken together, however, they can be 
seen as either providing more effective and efficient mechanisms for regulating user behaviour or, less 
optimistically, as a worrying trend in unduly strengthening, through public law, the influence of private actors. 
 
An emerging shift in governance: enrolling private intermediaries 
As the internet continues to grow in importance for our everyday lives, the inability of existing legal instruments 
to provide effective remedies for civil wrongs, and constraints on illegal behaviour, is becoming a massive 
problem across the entire breadth of national legal systems. There is a great deal of frustration, globally, that the 
internet has proved so difficult to regulate, and that the intermediaries who are in a position to act often have no 
formal responsibility to do so. 
One of the most common obligations that private actors seek to have imposed upon intermediaries is an 
obligation to respond to complaints and remove content from their networks. 'Notice-and-takedown' is the broad 
term given to this process. Such obligations are currently most formalised and most used in copyright law: 
Google alone receives over 32 million copyright takedown requests a month to remove URLs from its search 
engine.5 The effectiveness of this type of regime – at least in terms of the speed with which notices are processed 
– makes it an attractive model to private actors.  
The operation of notice-and-takedown in copyright is predicated upon the threat of potential liability for non-
compliance being placed upon intermediaries. The prototype for this type of law, the United States’ Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (‘DMCA’), was enacted in 1998 as a legislative bargain: it provides certainty for 
telecommunications providers in the form of immunity from financial penalty for copyright infringement, on the 
condition that they adopt efficient schemes for removing apparently infringing content when notified.6  
The core problem with liability as a motivator is that there are few intermediaries left to be sued. In copyright in 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
3  See further, Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and 
the Arts 147. 
4 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [2012] HCA 16 (20 April 2012). 
5 Google, Transparency Report (2014) <http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/?hl=en>. 
6   See Dianne M. Barker, ‘Defining the Contours of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act: The Growing 
Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 47, 47-50. 
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particular, the rules for intermediary liability have somewhat settled – particularly for US-based copyright 
industries suing under US law. It is now generally clear that intermediaries whose role in infringement is limited 
to providing a general purpose service or technology with substantial non-infringing uses,7 and who do not 
actively encourage infringement,8 will not be liable for infringement. Rightsholders are now, by and large, in a 
position where the major intermediaries who facilitate infringement in a way that would attract liability are not 
often within jurisdictional reach, and other intermediaries upon whom some duties might usefully be imposed are 
largely immune from suit. 
Take, for example, current debates about filesharing over BitTorrent. The developers of the general purpose 
BitTorrent protocol and its software implementations are often not liable for how it is used. The people who 
upload infringing content are difficult to identify and many. The indexers and trackers of any significant size that 
facilitate access to infringing content are dispersed – The Pirate Bay, most notably, has proved extremely difficult 
to shut down on the basis that its human and technical infrastructure is very often out of jurisdictional reach.9 
This leaves rightsholders with few avenues for enforcement under existing law. 
The current limits of intermediary liability have led copyright lobbyists to exert massive pressure to change the 
rhetoric of enforcement. One of the key frontiers for copyright enforcement over the last decade has been a 
struggle over whose responsibility it is to enforce copyright interests. Rightsholders, particularly the large US-
based entertainment and publishing industries, are currently seeking to require various groups of intermediaries, 
who are not otherwise liable, to 'do something' about rampant infringement. In particular, the agenda of 
rightsholders for the greater part of the last decade has been to seek new mechanisms to co-opt ISPs into 
enforcing copyright. The key specific goals have been to get ISPs to block access to infringing content hosted 
outside of the jurisdiction; to pass on notices of infringement to their subscribers and impose sanctions upon 
allegedly repeat infringers; and to hand over the personal details of subscribers who have received multiple 
allegations of infringement. 
This chapter illustrates one aspect of the ongoing global efforts to seek to impose new obligations on 
intermediaries through a discussion of three recent developments in Australian copyright law. Australia is a 
particularly illuminating jurisdiction in this regard as it has been one of the important targets for development of 
new copyright enforcement measures over the last decade. These efforts have included high profile lawsuits, 
largely financed by the US copyright industries,10 one against the operators of the Kazaa filesharing network11 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
7 Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc (1984) 464 U.S. 417. 
8 MGM Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd (2005) 545 U.S. 913. 
9 See Bernard A. Mantel, 'The Google Police: How the Indictment of the Pirate Bay Presents a New 
Solution to Online Piracy' (2012) 20 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 77; Tara Touloumis, 'Buccaneers and Bucks from the 
Internet: Pirate Bay and the Entertainment Industry' (2009) 19 Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 253.  
10 See Robert D McCallum, Diplomatic Cable 08CANBERRA1197, FILM/TV INDUSTRY FILES 
COPYRIGHT CASE AGAINST AUSSIE ISP (30 November 2008) Wikileaks 
<https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08CANBERRA1197.html> Referring to the iiNet case, the US Ambassador 
to Australia writes: ‘Despite the lead role of AFACT and the inclusion of Australian companies Village 
Roadshow and the Seven Network, this is an MPAA/American studios production. … MPAA was the mover 
behind AFACT’s case (AFACT is essentially MPAA’s Australian subcontractor; MPAA/MPA have no 
independent, formal presence here), acting on behalf of the six American studios involved. MPAA prefers that its 
leading role not be made public. AFACT and MPAA worked hard to get Village Roadshow and the Seven 
'
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and the other against a large general purpose ISP.12 Over the same period, intense political debates have erupted 
over, on the one hand, the apparently high rates of copyright infringement amongst Australian consumers and, on 
the other hand, the relatively high prices and low levels of service to which Australian consumers are exposed in 
accessing copyright goods when compared with the experiences of consumers in other western countries.13 
Pressure on the Government to reform copyright law has been strong from all sides: users of copyright are 
seeking a dramatic increase in exceptions to copyright infringement;14 the telecommunications industry is seeking 
greater certainty through the expansion of “safe harbours”15 from liability;16 and rightsholder groups are heavily 
engaged in lobbying for stronger copyright enforcement mechanisms. As part of these latter two lobbying efforts, 
large media conglomerates have drastically increased their political donations in recent years and represent some 
of the biggest single donors to both major political parties.17  
 These lobbying and litigation efforts have been effective in Australia in bringing about three major legal changes 
in 2015. First, a government-sanctioned new industry code implementing a graduated response scheme has been 
developed and is expected to be approved by late 2015.18 Second, in an Australian court, in April 2015, 
rightsholders were partially successful in seeking preliminary discovery from ISPs of the identifying details of 
account holders alleged to have infringed their rights.19 Third, in June 2015, a new provision came into force in 
Australian copyright law that enables rightsholders to apply for orders requiring ISPs to block access to foreign 
websites that facilitate copyright infringement.20 These developments have all proceeded on the basis that ISPs 
are not generally legally liable for the infringing acts of their subscribers: they follow a highly-publicised, 
unsuccessful attempt by rightsholders to extend intermediary liability law to a general purpose ISP in Australia.21  
In this case against iiNet, the plaintiffs, led by the US Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), sought a judgment which would have had the result that 
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
Network to agree to be the public Australian faces on the case to make it clear there are Australian equities at 
stake, and this isn’t just Hollywood ’bullying some poor little Australian ISP.". 
11 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 222 FCR 465. 
12  Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [2012] HCA 16 (20 April 2012). 
13 House Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, ‘At What Cost? IT Pricing and the 
Australia Tax’ (Parliament of Australia, 29 July 2013) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=ic/itprici
ng/report.htm>. 
14 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Copyright and the Digital Economy’ (122, ALRC, 13 February 
2014) <http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/copyright-report-122>. 
15  "Safe harbour" schemes limit relief against carriage service providers who fall within a "safe harbour" 
specified in Pt V Div 2AA of the Copyright Act 1968 from the risk of liability for inadvertently hosting or 
communicating infringing material on behalf of their users. 
16 Communications Alliance Ltd, 'Attorney-General's Consultation Paper on Revising the Scope of the Safe 
Harbour Scheme in the Copyright Act 1968' Submission (22 November 2011) 
<http://www.commsalliance.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/32337/Copyright-Safe-Harbours-submission-22-
Nov-2011-Final.pdf>.  
17 Allie Coyne, ‘Village Roadshow Boosts Donations amidst Copyright Crackdown’ iTnews, 2 February 
2015 <http://www.itnews.com.au/News/399933,village-roadshow-boosts-donations-amidst-copyright-
crackdown.aspx>. 
18  Communications Alliance, ‘Copyright Notice Scheme, Industry Code C653:2015’ 
<http://www.commsalliance.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/48551/C653-Copyright-Notice-Scheme-Industry-
Code-FINAL.pdf>. 
19  Dallas BuyersClub LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] FCA 317. 
20  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s. 115A. 
21  Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42. 
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ordinary consumer ISPs could be held liable when their subscribers used their networks to infringe.   
In the iiNet case, the Australian High Court found that Australian ISPs are under no obligation to take measures 
against subscribers – such as sending infringement warning notices or terminating subscriber accounts – based 
only on the strength of copyright infringement allegations made by rightsholders.22 The primary infringements at 
issue in iiNet involved the communication of films and television programs using the BitTorrent protocol. The 
High Court placed great emphasis on the fact that iiNet, as a mere ISP, had no control over BitTorrent or how its 
subscribers were using filesharing technologies.23 The court stated: “[T]he extent of iiNet’s power was limited. It 
had no direct power to prevent the primary infringements and could only ensure that result indirectly by 
terminating the contractual relationship it had with its customers.”24 This “indirect” contractual power was not 
sufficient to ground liability. There were associated issues, including with the reliability of the rightsholders’ 
notices of infringement, that led the court to conclude that iiNet’s inaction in the face of these allegations had 
been reasonable.25 Ultimately, the High Court held that iiNet was not liable for its inaction in response to 
allegations of infringement against its users. Its indifference was simply that of “somebody who did not consider 
it his business to interfere, who had no desire to see another person’s copyright infringed, but whose view was 
that copyright and infringement were matters in this case not for him, but for the owners of the copyright.”26   
After iiNet: enlisting ISPs in the fight against copyright infringement 
Given the almost complete failure to extend liability to general purpose ISPs, rightsholders have not resorted to 
further litigation in Australia but have instead sought to enlist the aid of ISPs through other means. The primary 
focus across several jurisdictions has been either to develop new statutory responsibilities for ISPs, or to achieve 
the same ends through non-legislative means. In France, South Korea, and New Zealand, rightsholders have been 
able to shepherd the introduction of 'graduated response' legislation designed to shift some of the burden for 
enforcement of copyright claims to ISPs and administrative agencies.27 A similar scheme in the UK is still under 
development. 28 
In a number of jurisdictions where it has not been possible to introduce legislative graduated response schemes, 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
22 See further: Kylie Pappalardo, ‘Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian 
Perspective’ (2014) 4(1) IP Theory 9; David Lindsay, ‘ISP Liability for End-User Copyright Infringements: The 
High Court Decision in Roadshow Films v iiNet’ (2012) 62(4) Telecommunications Journal of Australia 53.1.  
23  Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 (20 April 2012) [112], [137] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
24  Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 (20 April 2012) [69]-[70] (French CJ, Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ), see also [139] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
25  Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 (20 April 2012) [78] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
26  Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 (20 April 2012) [144] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), see also 
[75]-[76] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
27 Michael Boardman, ‘Digital Copyright Protection and Graduated Response: A Global Perspective’ 
(2010) 33 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 223; Peter K Yu, ‘The Graduated 
Response’ (2010) 62 Florida Law Review 1373. For an excellent overview and assessment of these schemes, see 
Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147. 
28 In July 2014, the UK government announced a new industry scheme, ‘Creative Content UK’, comprising 
of two components – a large-scale multi-media copyright education campaign, commencing soon, and a notice-
and-notice subscriber alert program that will be implemented at a later date following the education campaign. 
See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-education-programme-launched-to-combat-online-piracy and 
http://www.bpi.co.uk/home/uk-creative-industries-and-isps-partner-in-major-new-initiative-to-promote-legal-
online-entertainment.aspx. 
Draft,'post+peer'review'manuscript'(Dec'2015).'Forthcoming'in'Intellectual'Property'Governance'for'the'
21st'Century:'Global'Evolution'(Mark'Perry'ed,'Spring,'2016).'
' ' '6'
rightsholders have instead sought to achieve the same practical regime (without, at least initially, any direct 
sanctions for users) through private agreements and industry codes of conduct.29 This has been achieved largely 
through 'coerced self-regulation'30 – with the state is still very much involved in ensuring that ISPs cooperate with 
rightsholders, issuing veiled and explicit threats to directly intervene if an agreement is not reached.31 In Ireland, 
rightsholders successfully sued Eircom, Ireland’s largest ISP, leading to a settlement through the development of 
a privately negotiated graduated response scheme.32 In the United States, a comprehensive ‘Copyright Alert 
System’ (colloquially called the ‘six strikes system’) was implemented after years of negotiations between ISPs 
and the content industry.33 Both schemes impose various obligations on ISPs to forward on allegations of 
infringement and, ultimately, implement some form of technical sanctions against alleged repeat infringers.34  
To date, there is no evidence that either the Irish scheme or the US system has reduced instances of copyright 
infringement.35 Data is scant, and the little evidence that has been collected is unreliable because it does not 
account for the possibility that users have not ceased infringement but have merely transitioned to other less 
detectable forms of infringement.36 Additionally, graduated response schemes can adversely impact upon internet 
users’ rights. The most concerning impact is that these schemes shift the burden of proof from the copyright 
owner to the accused user.37 In ordinary civil cases, the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish 
copyright infringement. Yet under these schemes, an allegation of infringement automatically triggers an action 
taken by the ISP against the accused user. If the user wishes to dispute the allegation he or she must raise 
evidence that his or her use was non-infringing or that the allegation is faulty in some way. This shifting of the 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
29 For example,  EMI Records & Ors v Eircom Ltd [2010] IEHC 108 [9].  
30 See Julia Black, 'Constitutionalising Self-Regulation' (1996) 59 The Modern Law Review 24.  
31 Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright 
Enforcement’ (2010) 89 Oregon Law Review 81. 
32 Since this scheme forms part of a settlement, the precise details are private. However, researchers have 
pieced together what they can of the terms: see Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 
Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147, 172-174. 
33 See http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/ and the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the parties (as occasionally amended), dated 6 July 2011 at 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf; Rebecca 
Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147, 175-177. See 
also Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms’ 
(2012) 23 Fordham Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1. 
34 See http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/ and the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the parties (as occasionally amended), dated 6 July 2011 at 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf; Rebecca 
Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147, 175-177; 
Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms’ (2012) 23 
Fordham Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1. 
35 Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147, 
191, 192. 
36 Ibid, 191-2, 198-200. The reaction of users in seeking ways of filesharing that are increasingly difficult 
to detect or quash accords with regulatory theory that punitive enforcement of the law is often less effective than 
persuasion, at least where punishment is used as an early choice. See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992), 26: “punitive enforcement 
engenders a game of regulatory cat-and-mouse whereby [actors] defy the spirit of the law by exploiting loopholes 
and the state writes more and more specific rules to cover the loopholes”. 
37 See Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five 
Norms’ (2012) 23 Fordham Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1, 53-53. 
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burden of proof raises significant concerns about the legitimacy of these schemes from a due process point-of-
view.38 In the US scheme, for instance, users are limited to only six ‘defences’ that they can raise against 
allegations of infringement and the defences do not cover the full spectrum of limitations and exceptions under 
US copyright law.39 Thus, users may have punitive action taken against them for uses that are not, in fact, 
infringing, and there is very little that users can do about it. Privately negotiated graduated response schemes also 
raise particular concerns related to transparency. The private nature of these schemes tends to mean that they are 
shrouded in secrecy, especially as to the specific processes used for the collection and evaluation of data against 
users.40 
Even before the High Court’s decision in the iiNet case, the Australian Government had been pushing for ISPs 
and the copyright industry in Australia to formulate an industry code of practice for combatting online 
infringement. In 2010, then Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Stephen Conroy, 
expressed a desire that the film and internet industries “sit down and try to come up with a code of conduct” for 
dealing with online infringement.41 In September 2011, the Federal Attorney-General’s Department convened a 
meeting with ‘key stakeholders’42 to discuss the state of the legislative landscape in relation to online copyright 
infringement.43 Attorney-General Robert McClelland44 “consistently stated that his preference [was] for an 
industry-based solution” rather than legislative reform.45 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
38 See Nicolas Suzor and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright 
Law’ (2011) 34(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1; Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response 
American Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms’ (2012) 23 Fordham Intellectual Property Media 
and Entertainment Law Journal 1, 53-53. 
39 Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms’ 
(2012) 23 Fordham Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1, 57-58; (arguing that the 
scheme does not permit users to raise defences based on sections 107 to 122 of the US Copyright Act, other than 
fair use in s. 109, and does not permit a user to argue that the relevant content was in the public domain for any 
reason other than that it was published before 1923); Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 
37 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147, 178-180. 
40 Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms’ 
(2012) 23 Fordham Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1, 57, 62-66; see also Nicolas 
Suzor and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright Law’ (2011) 34(1) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 1. 
41 Ben Grubb, ‘Conroy calls for piracy code of conduct’, ZDNET, 7 February 2010, reporting on Stephen 
Conroy’s interview on ABC’s Hungry Beast program on 5 February 2010, http://www.zdnet.com.au/conroy-
calls-for-piracy-code-of-conduct-339300874.htm. 
42 Including representatives from the Australian Content Industry Group (ACIG), Australian Federation 
Against Copyright Theft (AFACT), Digital Entertainment Alliance Australia (DEAA), Telstra, Optus, the 
Internet Industry Association (IIA) and the Communications Alliance. It is worth noting that ‘key stakeholders’ 
did not include user rights groups. 
43 Andrew Colley, ‘A-G in call for talks on online piracy’, The Australian, 24 August 2011, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/a-g-in-call-for-talks-on-online-piracy/story-e6frgakx-
1226120005661. See further, Renai LeMay, ‘Secret BitTorrent agreement on the cards’, Delimiter.com.au, 29 
September 2011, http://delimiter.com.au/2011/09/29/secret-bittorrent-agreement-on-the-cards/. 
44 The Hon. Robert McClelland was the Attorney-General for Australia from December 2007 to December 
2011: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FJK6%
22. 
45 Roger Wilkins, Attorney-General’s Department secretary, quoted in Andrew Colley, ‘A-G in call for 
talks on online piracy’, The Australian, 24 August 2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/a-g-in-
call-for-talks-on-online-piracy/story-e6frgakx-1226120005661. 
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In late November 2011, a coalition of Australian ISPs presented a proposal to the content industries for a 
voluntary 'notice and discovery scheme' for dealing with online copyright infringement.46 The coalition of ISPs 
presenting this scheme proposed that costs for its operation be borne by rightsholders.47 The various industry 
bodies were never able to agree on costs; the content industries rejected this particular proposal but expressed a 
willingness to work with ISPs to formulate an alternative scheme.48 Discussions ultimately stalled, however, in 
the wake of the iiNet decision. General academic and industry consensus was that, post-iiNet, ISPs were in such a 
strong legal position that they had no incentive to agree to industry codes requiring them to pass on warning 
notices or implement any other measures to prevent copyright infringement.49 
This stalemate between ISPs and the content industries led to significant apparent frustration on the part of the 
new Labor Government. In late 2013, the Attorney-General’s Department sought to recommence discussions 
with Australian telecommunication providers and content creators about industry protocols for tackling copyright 
infringement,50 but again nothing came out of these discussions. The Government’s frustration came to a head in 
July 2014, when the Attorney-General’s Department released a discussion paper entitled, ‘Online Copyright 
Infringement’.51 The discussion paper evidenced a vexation that ISPs were not doing more to combat online 
infringement. In it, the Government proposed sweeping amendments to Australia's authorisation liability doctrine 
that would have overturned the iiNet decision by de-linking the element of control from secondary liability.52 The 
paper was framed in the over-arching rhetoric that “everybody has a role” in reducing online copyright 
infringement.53 On this basis, the Government essentially proposed to predicate liability primarily on an 
intermediary's failure to take 'reasonable steps' to prevent or avoid infringement even without a direct power to 
prevent particular infringing acts.54 
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46 Communications Alliance Ltd, ‘Australian Internet Service Provider (ISP) Proposal: A Scheme to Address 
Online Copyright Infringement’, available at 
http://www.commsalliance.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/32293/Copyright-Industry-Scheme-Proposal-Final.pdf. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Josh Taylor, ‘Content owners reject ISP piracy scheme’, ZDNet, 29 November 2011, 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/content-owners-reject-isp-piracy-scheme-339326967.htm and Supratim Adhikari, 
‘Content owners reject ISPs’ anti-piracy scheme: report’, Technology Spectator, 29 November 2011, 
http://technologyspectator.com.au/industry/media/content-owners-reject-isps-anti-piracy-scheme-report. 
49 See, for example, David Lindsay, ‘ISP Liability for End-User Copyright Infringements: The High Court 
Decision in Roadshow Films v iiNet’ (2012) 62(4) Telecommunication Journal of Australia 53.1, 53.18. 
50 Mitchell Bingemann, ‘Brandis calls time on online piracy’, The Australian, 28 October 2013, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/media/digital/brandis-calls-time-on-online-piracy/story-fna03wxu-
1226747867711#; see also Campbell Simpson, ‘Australian attorney-general won’t confirm copyright meetings 
with ISPs’, CNet Australia, 30 October 2013, http://www.cnet.com.au/australian-attorney-general-wont-confirm-
copyright-meetings-with-isps-339345833.htm. 
51 Australian Government, ‘Online Copyright Infringement Discussion Paper’ (July 2014) 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/OnlineCopyrightInfringement/FINAL%20-
%20Online%20copyright%20infringement%20discussion%20paper%20-%20PDF.PDF. 
52 Kylie Pappalardo, Submission to the Online Copyright Infringement Discussion Paper (July 2014) 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/OnlineCopyrightInfringement/OnlineCopyrightInfringement-
KyliePappalardo.pdf  
53 Australian Government, ‘Online Copyright Infringement Discussion Paper’ (July 2014) 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/OnlineCopyrightInfringement/FINAL%20-
%20Online%20copyright%20infringement%20discussion%20paper%20-%20PDF.PDF, p 2. 
54 Kylie Pappalardo, Submission to the Online Copyright Infringement Discussion Paper (July 2014) 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/OnlineCopyrightInfringement/OnlineCopyrightInfringement-
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After significant vocal opposition from user groups, copyright academics, and other commentators, the Australian 
Government withdrew the proposal. Nevertheless, the paper served an important political function. It presented a 
harsh reality to the bulk of ISPS who had so far refused to meet rightsholders’ demands that they take more steps 
to actively police the actions of their users. When the Government subsequently called on ISPs to reach 
agreement with copyright owners on an industry code to tackle copyright infringement, the threat was explicit 
and clear: if no code was agreed upon, the Government would either mandate its own code for the industry or 
introduce legislation that would lead to significant risk of liability for ISPs and other technological 
intermediaries. This threat, as it turned out, was a sufficient incentive to convince ISPs to progress with a self-
governing negotiated graduated response code. 
1. An industry-led graduated response code 
On 10 December 2014, the Federal Attorney-General and the Minister for Communications requested, in a joint 
letter to industry leaders, that a code be developed through consultation with ISPs, consumer representatives and 
rightsholders from the music, film, television and performing arts industries. In line with the Federal 
Government’s timeline, the final Code was submitted to the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) for registration as an industry code under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) on 8 April 2015. The 
Code proposes a Copyright Notice Scheme that will apply only to residential fixed internet account holders.55 The 
Code has not yet been registered by the ACMA because ISPs and rightsholders have not yet been able to reach 
commercial agreement about who will bear the costs of the scheme. This continues to be a major stumbling block 
in bringing the Code into effect.56 Once the Notice Scheme is registered as an industry code under the 
Telecommunications Act, approximately 70 of Australia's largest ISPs will be required to comply with it.57 
Failure to do so will make them liable to civil penalties. The effectiveness of the Code will be independently 
evaluated 18 months after its commencement. 
Under the Notice Scheme, rightsholders will be able to send infringement reports to ISPs that identify IP 
addresses alleged to have been used to infringe copyright.58 ISPs will then be obliged to take reasonable steps to 
match the IP addresses identified by the rightsholders to account holders to which the IP addresses were assigned 
at the time of the alleged infringement.59 Where an IP address can be matched, the ISP will be required to send 
the account holder an 'Education Notice' which provides information on the alleged infringement, the identity of 
the rightsholder and a description of the content it is alleged has been infringed.60 The notice would also contain, 
amongst other things, the assurance that personal information has not been passed on to a third party, an 
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
KyliePappalardo.pdf, p 4. 
55 Communications Alliance, ‘Copyright Notice Scheme, Industry Code C653:2015’ 
<http://www.commsalliance.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/48551/C653-Copyright-Notice-Scheme-
Industry-Code-FINAL.pdf>. 
56  The Code was initially scheduled to commence by 1 September 2015. 
57 The Code will only apply to ISPs who have 1,000 account holders individually or as part of a corporate 
group, and an initial cap on volume will be limited to up to 200,000 notices to be processed every 12 months. 
58  Communications Alliance, ‘Copyright Notice Scheme, Industry Code C653:2015’ 
<http://www.commsalliance.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/48551/C653-Copyright-Notice-Scheme-Industry-
Code-FINAL.pdf> [3.4]. 
59  Ibid [3.6.2]. 
60 Ibid [3.6.3], [3.7.1] 
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acknowledgement that the detected alleged infringement does not necessarily correlate to the account holder's 
activity, and general information about accessing lawful online content.61 Upon receipt of further infringement 
notices with respect to an account holder, the ISP will be required to issue a second 'Warning Notice' and a third 
'Final Notice'.62 
If a Final Notice is received within a 12 month period, the Code provides that the account holder will have the 
option to challenge the validity of the allegations by having them independently reviewed by a panel.63 The panel 
will comprise of six representative members: two appointed by rightsholders, two by ISPs and two each from 
different consumer organisations. Either after the allocated challenge period has expired or if a challenge is 
unsuccessful, the IP address related to the account will be listed on a “Final Notice List.” Rightsholders will be 
able to write to an ISP requesting the Final Notice List, which will detail the number of account holders issued 
with notices and any record of acknowledgement from the account holders that they received a Final Notice. The 
policy provides that rightsholders may then elect to file an application for preliminary discovery in court, seeking 
access to account holders' details. ISPs will be required to “act reasonably” to facilitate and assist rightsholders’ 
applications to court. The Code leaves it to the courts' discretion as to whether preliminary discovery should be 
granted. 
The proposed Code claims to be designed to deter copyright infringing behaviour and, at the same time, to 
educate consumers about available and lawful content alternatives. In focussing on education, the Code appears 
to differ from graduated response schemes implemented in overseas jurisdictions which include measures 
requiring ISPs to take action against users suspected of infringing copyright by suspending their accounts and 
eventually terminating service.64 Despite its emphasis on education, the proposed Code presents a number of key 
concerns for consumers.  Most importantly, there is potential for abuse of the system once rightsholders obtain 
preliminary discovery of account holders’ personal details. In other jurisdictions, some rightsholders have used 
discovery for so-called 'speculative invoicing', where rightsholders contact consumers with offers to settle 
potential infringement actions for grossly disproportionate amounts.65 Speculative invoicing is dangerous for two 
reasons. First, the settlement figures claimed can have little relationship to the harm suffered and, as such, 
become unfair extra-legal penalties that abuse preliminary discovery available through the legal system.66 
Second, consumers face a difficult choice between paying up or incurring significant expense in contesting an 
action in court. Courts in Australia and internationally have begun to exercise greater judicial oversight over the 
ways that rightsholders communicate with users in order to limit these practices.67 As one example, we consider 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
61  Ibid [3.7.1]. 
62  Ibid [3.6.3]. 
63  Ibid [3.10]. 
64  For example, the limited scheme in Ireland implemented in response to the EMI Records & Ors v Eircom 
Ltd [2010] IEHC 108 case seems to empower the ISP to terminate subscriber accounts upon receiving three 
notices of infringement. Additionally, the Copyright Alert Scheme implemented in the United States permits ISPs 
to impose ‘mitigation measures’ upon receipt of the fifth and sixth notice of infringement – these measures may 
include temporary restriction of the users’ internet access. See Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ 
(2014) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147, 173 (on the Irish scheme) and 177 (on the US scheme).  
65 See, e.g., Patrick Collins. Inc, v John Doe 1 , 2012 US Dist LEXIS 71122 (ED NY, 2013), 5.  
66 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 723 (Ch), [137]. 
67 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 723 (Ch), [36]; Voltage Pictures LLC 
v John Doe (2014) 240 A.C.W.S (3d) 964. [133]. 
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the Australian Federal Court’s efforts to limit speculative invoicing in Dallas BuyersClub LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] 
FCA 317 below. This case suggests that Australian courts may be willing and able to provide the supervision to 
avoid abuse of the Code. 
2. Preliminary discovery 
The scheduled implementation of the graduated response code by September 2015 did not come soon enough for 
some rightsholders. Dallas Buyers Club LLC, the US entity which owns the copyright in the film, and its parent 
company Voltage Pictures LLC, were the applicants in the proceedings seeking preliminary discovery from iiNet 
and five other Australian ISPs of the identities of the account holders associated with ISP addresses which the 
applicants claimed had shared the film over BitTorrent. The applicants believed that although the relevant 
account holders may not necessarily be the same as the persons infringing their copyright, their information 
would help in leading to the identification of the actual infringers.  
The ISPs resisted the application on many bases. The ISPs' key argument was that owing to the nature of peer-to-
peer file sharing sites like BitTorrent, the identified IP addresses only downloaded a very small “sliver” of the 
film, which is insufficient to show 'substantial' copying as required for a finding of copyright infringement.68 The 
ISPs put forward a number of reasons to support the argument that the Court's discretion to order preliminary 
discovery should not be exercised. These included that the demonstrated infringements were trivial in nature and 
it made no commercial sense for the applicants to commence the proceedings in seeking such small sums, that 
there was evidence suggesting that the applicants would engage in the practice of speculative invoicing if they 
were given the information of the account holders they sought, and that the preliminary discovery process was 
being used as a tool of investigation rather than identification.69 
On 7 April 2015, Justice Perram of the Federal Court delivered judgment in Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd 
[2015] FCA 317, ordering preliminary discovery from six Australian ISPs of the information of 4,726 account 
holders of IP addresses believed to have infringed copyright in the 2012 Jean-Marc Vallée film Dallas Buyers 
Club. While major rightsholders have indicated that they have no plans to sue Australian subscribers whose 
information they obtain under the industry Code described above, this decision illustrates how cases may proceed 
if  the Code proves to be unwieldy or ineffective for the purposes of deterring alleged copyright infringement. 
Importantly, the decision imposes substantial protections for consumers through judicial oversight of the 
discovery process. 
Justice Perram rejected the ISPs' submissions and ordered the ISPs to provide the applicants with the names and 
physical addresses of the account holders associated with each of the 4,726 IP addresses.70 While it was accepted 
that the identified IP addresses only downloaded a small sliver of the film, His Honour was satisfied that this 
provided strong circumstantial evidence that the end-user was infringing the copyright in the film overall and 
held that it was sufficient evidence for a preliminary discovery application.71 At this stage of proceedings, it was 
not necessary for the applicants to establish a prima facie case of infringement, just that they had a real case 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
68 Dallas BuyersClub LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] FCA 317, [28]. 
69 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] FCA 317, [73]. 
70 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] FCA 317, [5]. 
71 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] FCA 317, [30]. 
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which was not fanciful.72 
In making the order, Justice Perram imposed conditions on the applicants. Firstly, the information of the account 
holders can only be used for the purposes of recovering compensation for the infringements and is not otherwise 
to be disclosed without the leave of the Federal Court. Secondly, a draft of any letter the applicants intend to send 
to account holders associated with the identified IP addresses must be submitted to his Honour.73 The second 
condition stems from the observation that any representations made to consumers about liabilities which they do 
not have or which are drastically inflated may constitute misleading or deceptive conduct within the meaning of 
section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).74  
In Justice Perram's final orders, ISPs were required to pay 75% of the applicants' costs of the proceedings.75 His 
Honour had initially ordered the applicants to pay all of the ISPs’ costs, but changed his order in response to the 
adversarial position adopted by the ISPs which “put nearly everything in issue” and extended the length of the 
court hearing.76 Justice Perram’s willingness to alter his costs order drastically reduces the incentive for future 
ISPs to diligently challenge discovery orders.77 
Justice Perram's decision to require court oversight of the way in which subscriber details are used is an 
extremely important protection against abuse of the legal process for preliminary discovery orders. Through this 
mechanism, the court has effectively reduced, if not eliminated, the risk of account holders being subject to 
speculative invoicing. Similar restrictions by courts have been important safeguards in both the UK78 and 
Canada79 to prevent extortionate demands that rightsholders, including Voltage, have made in other 
jurisdictions.80 This has proved important in Australia – in a subsequent hearing, Justice Perram rejected Voltage 
Pictures' draft demands as unreasonable and excessive.81 Voltage Pictures were initially elusive as to the 
settlement figure it would include in letters sent to users,82 but eventually informed the Federal Court that it 
would include the purchase price of a single legitimate copy of the film, another fee for sharing the film to other 
BitTorrent users, a punishment for any other infringement of the copyright in other, unrelated, content that 
subscribers admit to have illicitly downloaded and an amount that would cover the cost of tracking down users 
associated with infringing downloads.83 While Justice Perram found that Voltage could ask for the costs of a 
single copy of the film and an appropriately proportioned fee to recover its legal costs so far. However, his 
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72 See Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2009) 259 ALR 254 
at [54]. 
73 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] FCA 317, [5]. 
74 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd [2015] FCA 317, [82]. 
75 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Limited (No 3) [2015] FCA 422, [7].  
76 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Limited (No 3) [2015] FCA 422, [6].  
77 See further Nicolas P Suzor, ‘Privacy v IP Litigation: Preliminary Third Party Discovery on the Internet’ 
(2004) 25 Australian Bar Review 227. 
78 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 723 (Ch), [36]. 
79 Voltage Pictures LLC v John Doe (2014) 240 A.C.W.S (3d) 964. [133]. 
80 See e.g. Ernesto, Hurt Locker Makers Target Record Breaking 24,583 BitTorrent Users (23 May 2011) 
TorrentFreek <https://torrentfreak.com/hurt-locker-makers-target-record-breaking-24583-bittorrent-users-
110523/>. 
81 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Limited (No 4) [2015] FCA 838.  
82  Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Limited (No 4) [2015] FCA 838, [9]-[12]. 
83  Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Limited (No 4) [2015] FCA 838, [15]. 
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Honour rejected attempts to multiply these fees, potentially thousands of times, for other BitTorrent peers to 
whom the subscriber may have transmitted parts of the film. His Honour also rejected the claim for monetary 
penalties based on infringements of other copyright owners’ rights to which account holders may have admitted. 
His Honour described Voltage's proposition that BitTorrent users might have avoided infringement by 
approaching Voltage to negotiate a distribution arrangement in return for a licence fee as “so surreal as not to be 
taken seriously”.84 
Ultimately, Justice Perram's refusal to allow Voltage to send its letters as drafted provides protection for 
consumers from speculative invoicing practices.85 This level of judicial oversight, if it is repeated in future cases, 
provides some assurance that the damages rightholders may seek from account holders must be far more 
reasonable than might otherwise be claimed in such demand letters. While this safeguard has not explicitly been 
introduced into the proposed Copyright Notice Scheme, preliminary discovery in the judicial system is the only 
mechanism for ISPs to disclose identifying details of subscribers. In this decision, the Australian Federal Court 
here has clearly set out a series of protections for consumers that will require rightsholders to make a binding 
commitment not to use discovery to seek damages that they would not reasonably be able to recover in litigation. 
 
3. Website blocking 
Given the two developments described above, it might appear that copyright owners have largely succeeded in 
their strategic aim to compel ISPs to pass infringement warnings on to ISP customers and to hand back to 
copyright owners at least some ISP customer details,86 in an effort to convince users that the threat of copyright 
enforcement is real.  It is perhaps unlikely that the majority of large rightsholders will pursue infringement 
actions against users, particularly given the disastrous public-relations results of the RIAA's campaign to sue tens 
of thousands of US consumers nearly ten years ago. At least for the giant media conglomerates, if not for the 
independent studios, Australia’s graduated response scheme appears designed primarily as a means either to scare 
consumers or to deliver targeted marketing messages aimed at encouraging consumers to gain access to copyright 
goods through legitimate channels. On the other hand, the limitations imposed by the Federal Court on the way 
that preliminary discovery can be used severely restricts the ability of the less scrupulous of the smaller 
rightsholders from using these schemes as a revenue-raising strategy. 
Rightsholders, as another alternative, have turned their attention to enlisting the aid of ISPs in order to block 
subscribers’ access to foreign websites that facilitate infringement. Frustrated with the continual “arms race” and 
jurisdictional challenges of locating and closing websites like The Pirate Bay, rightsholders have sought to extend 
a website blocking scheme originally developed in the UK to other jurisdictions, including Australia. In 2011, the 
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84 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Limited (No 4) [2015] FCA 838, [23]. 
85  As of 4 September 2015, Dallas Buyers Club LLC decided not to appeal Justice Perram’s ruling against its 
methodology for calculating damages. Indications are that they are re-working how to pursue additional damages 
beyond what the court has said it would allow: Claire Reilly, Dallas Buyers Club turns down appeal, holds firm on 
damages (4 September 2015) CNET <http://www.cnet.com/au/news/dallas-buyers-club-turns-down-appeal-holds-firm-
on-damages/>. 
86  Though ISPs are not compelled to hand over the identities of the customers; this is information which remains 
within the purview of the courts on a case by case basis. 
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England and Wales High Court granted injunctive relief against an ISP, British Telecom (BT), requiring it to 
block the Newzbin2 BitTorrent indexer87 and ordering relief for the first time under s 97A of the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), which had been introduced in 2003.88 This followed an earlier successful 
action against Newzbin's first incarnation, where the UK company responsible for operating the site was ordered 
to shut it down.89 Shortly afterward, the site was reincarnated as Newzbin2 – a direct copy of the original, hosted 
outside of jurisdictional reach in the Seychelles. Rightsholders, faced with a valid successful judgment with a 
largely ineffective remedy, sought to require one of the UK's ISPs to block access to the new site.  
The BT decision proved to be an attractive model for rightsholders. While on a technical level the blocks are 
trivially easy to circumvent, many more orders for UK ISPs to block websites have since been issued. The 
scheme has expanded as well. In the UK, the Cartier decision extended the obligation to block to include sites 
that were enabling the infringement of trade marks by others who traded in counterfeit goods.90 This decision, 
surprisingly, found that such an obligation arose under Article 11 of the EU's Enforcement Directive,91 despite 
the fact that s 97A, on which earlier orders were based, applies only to copyright infringement.92 Similar orders 
were also made in copyright law by other European Courts – although the European Court of Justice eventually 
found that Dutch orders to block file sharing websites were ineffective and therefore imposed disproportionate 
restrictions on freedom of communication.93 
Rightsholders have sought to extend their victories in Europe to Australia and other jurisdictions. On 26 June 
2015, the Australian Federal Government amended the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to allow rightsholders to apply 
to the Federal Court for an injunction requiring ISPs to disable access to websites hosted in foreign 
jurisdictions.94 Rightsholders must show that the online location either directly infringes copyright or facilitates 
infringement.95 Rightsholders bear the onus of showing that the online location has a primary purpose of 
infringing or facilitating the copyright infringement.96 The Court may take into consideration a range of factors 
including whether disabling access to the online location is a proportionate response in the circumstances, the 
impact on any person likely to be affected by the grant of the injunction, and whether it is in the public interest to 
disable access to the online location.97 The legislation provides that, if granted, the injunction must require the 
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87 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch) 
(26 October 2011). 
88 The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003/2498) (UK), reg. 27(1). 
89 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Anor v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (29 March 
2010). 
90 Cartier, Montblanc and Richemont v BSkyB, BT, TalkTalk, EE and Virgin (Open Rights Group 
intervening) [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) (17 October 2014). 
91 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
92 See Michael Williams and Rebecca Smith, 'Searching for the silver bullet: How website blocking 
injunctions are changing online IP enforcement (2014) 25 AIPJ 59.  
93 REIN v ZIGGO (2012), translation provided by: 
<http://pirateparty.org.au/media/documents/ECLI_NL_GHDHA_2014_88_ENG_Ziggo_v_BREIN.pdf> 
94 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115A, introduced by Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Act 2015 
(Cth). 
95  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115A(1).  
96  Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth), 38. 
97 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115A(5). See also, Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright 
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ISP to take reasonable steps to disable access to the online location.98 The estimated cost to ISPs of complying 
with injunctions is expected to total approximately  $130,000 on an annual basis.99 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the 'primary purpose' test is an intentionally high threshold for the 
rightsholder to meet, as a safeguard against potential abuse.100 In exercising its discretion, the court may take into 
account the flagrancy of the infringement or its facilitation.101 The legislation as enacted, however, raises serious 
concerns about how it will be interpreted by the courts. In particular, it is unclear when an online location will 
‘facilitate’ an infringement. The word 'facilitate' has not been defined in the Copyright Act and is unfamiliar to 
Australian copyright law.102 It appears to be broader than the term ‘authorise’, which conditions liability for 
secondary copyright infringement. Despite the Government's assurances, it appears likely that the filtering 
scheme may be used to block foreign sites that would not actually be liable for copyright infringement if they 
were hosted within Australia. 
This Australian legislation passed both houses of Parliament with little debate or opposition. One of the few 
voices of dissent was Greens Senator Scott Ludlam, whose address to the Senate expressed concern about the 
dangerous potential for “expansion and scope creep”.103 Senator Ludlam pointed out that the Australian 
Government's record is not great when it comes to carefully tailoring legislation designed to regulate the internet; 
Senator Ludlam cited the secret blacklists compiled by ACMA in 2009, which notoriously listed clearly 
innocuous sites that were erroneously proposed to be blocked alongside sites that contained child abuse material. 
Several years later, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission inadvertently blocked over 250,000 
innocent sites in addition to the one site it was targeting,104 eventually leading to a Parliamentary review into the 
administrative enforcement powers available under the Telecommunications Act 1997 to require ISPs to block 
websites.105 
The legitimacy of decentralised enforcement 
The Australian changes explored here mark an important shift in the way that obligations are imposed on online 
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Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth), 5. 
98  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115A(2). 
99 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth), 11. 
100 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth), 38. 
101 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth), 5. 
102 See, for example, Australian Digital Alliance, 'Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 ' 
Submission 16 to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=f86f1c37-04aa-46bd-989f-148afb561037&subId=350426> 7; 
Assoc. Prof.  Kimberlee Weatherall, 'Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 ' Submission 23 to 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=ed054552-0a85-4d04-8725-5996e19a71e6&subId=350272> 3.  
103 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 2008, 4021-4026 (Scott Ludlam), 4024. 
104 Bernard Keane, ASIC Accidentally Blocked 250,000 Sites in Scam Campaign (4 June 2013) Crikey 
<http://blogs.crikey.com.au/thestump/2013/06/04/asic-accidentally-blocked-250000-sites-in-scam-campaign/>. 
105 House of Representatives Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, Balancing Freedom and 
Protection: Inquiry into the Use of Subsection 313(3) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 by Government 
Agencies to Disrupt the Operation of Illegal Online Services (1 June 2015) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Infrastructure_and_Communications/Inquir
y_into_the_use_of_section_313_of_the_Telecommunications_Act_to_disrupt_the_operation_of_illegal_online_s
ervices/Report>. 
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intermediaries. The dominant legal means of enlisting the assistance of online intermediaries in copyright 
enforcement had, until recently, taken the form of the threat of secondary liability. These new methods do not 
depend on the threat of liability to make intermediaries compliant – they give copyright owners more direct 
power to require intermediaries to aid them in their enforcement pursuits. This reflects a more blunt approach to 
copyright enforcement: in some cases, ISPs are required to act without any effective judicial scrunity of the 
methods employed, which exposes ISPs to a great deal of uncertainty about, and risk concerning, when the 
actions of their subscribers must trigger a response. The law sets standards for compliance by the ISPs, and any 
failure in meeting those standards leaves the ISP open to very expensive potential claims from copyright owners. 
The predictable result is that the intermediary ISP will enforce the law in a way that errs on the side of over-
enforcement, impinging on the legitimate rights of subscribers to free expression106 and due process.107   
Debates about the appropriate extent of ISP liability continue to fester in many jurisdictions and in multilateral 
fora, without much hope of resolution. There are at least four groups of serious competing tensions that are not 
easily reconcilable: the importance of developing effective mechanisms to enforce the law, the liberty interests of 
individuals, the liberty interests of intermediaries, and the substantive intellectual property rights of rightsholders. 
Most of the recorded debate has been rooted only in the conflict between the ISPs and rightsholders, and has not 
adequately considered the interests of internet users.108 A large number of debates about intermediary liability 
continue to falter on the core difficulty of developing governance procedures that are responsive to the needs of 
stakeholders without sacrificing the 'generativity'109 of the system – the openness of infrastructure that has made 
the internet such a powerful tool for innovation and liberty.110  In large part, this is an anxiety about the 
sophistication of law and the ability of lawmakers to regulate technology – a fear that bad law will hinder 
innovation and liberty.111 
Two of the three recent changes in Australian law described here show a growing sophistication in the way that 
states regulate intermediaries through discrete obligations, not by directly imposing liability on intermediaries 
based on the conduct of their users. While these obligations are still generally resisted by telecommunications 
industries, in the end we are seeing compromises reflected in government sanctioned solutions between copyright 
holders and intermediary ISPs, such as legislative bargains or essentially self-governing negotiated industry 
codes, which are able to provide workable methods of enforcing law without introducing risks or costs too high 
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for intermediaries. In these compromises, however, it appears to be the interests of end users that are largely left 
out. In the context of this shift, there is, for instance, an important gap in knowledge about how intermediaries 
make decisions to take down or refuse to take down content,112 how those decisions may be influenced by both 
state and non-state actors,113 and how the rights of individuals to due process are actually protected in these 
processes.114  
In the context of increasing pressures on intermediaries from rightsholders and, in turn, governments, there is a 
growing global unease about how the rights of individuals can be protected online.115 The task of identifying and 
developing social, technical, and legal approaches that can improve the legitimacy of online governance is an 
increasingly pressing issue.116 This is also a recognised gap in the regulatory theory literature, where scholars 
have identified a clear need to further explore how constitutional values and rights can be protected when 
governance is decentralised.117 There is an increasingly pressing need to interrogate what good, legitimate 
governance should require of private online intermediaries. We suggest that a key frame for analysis should be 
based on the constitutional principles of the rule of law – particularly certainty, due process, consent, and respect 
for fundamental rights.118 This analysis foregrounds two main sets of questions: 
1.' How can intermediaries respond to the demands of disparate groups of public authorities and non-state 
actors? This raises important questions about not only how to deal with conflicting obligations (a classic 
jurisdictional problem), but whether and how intermediaries should resist these demands and protect the 
freedom of their users to communicate and seek information.119 
2.' How can different actors influence the way that intermediaries design and govern their networks to 
improve legitimacy? Intermediaries are under mounting pressures to increase the transparency of the 
decisions they make and the requests they receive from states and private actors,120 but how well 
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increased transparency is working remains unclear. More work needs to be done to closely examine the 
ways that intermediaries interact with, adopt, and resist social, market, and legal pressures to develop 
more legitimate policies and terms of service.121 
The analysis that is needed now, in light of the recent Australian legal developments outlined above, must 
specifically examine the intersection between these regulatory provisions and public constitutional values.122 The 
language of constitutionalism and rights has been almost exclusively applied to the actions of the state. It does not 
apply directly to the technical and policy decisions of private online platforms.123 But this is precisely what is 
needed as both state and non-state actors continue to place pressure on intermediaries to take more responsibility 
for enforcing law and social norms. 
The creator of the World Wide Web, Sir Tim Berners Lee, recently called for a 'Magna Carta for the Web'124 to 
protect the rights of individuals. In New Zealand, these principles have made it as far as a draft Bill of Internet 
Rights and Freedoms.125  We suggest that a great deal more work is needed to adapt the values of 
constitutionalism as a measure of the ability of decentralised regulatory arrangements to protect the substantive 
and procedural rights of individuals. The measure of legitimacy that is needed here is both 'reflexive' and 
'responsive':126 it requires a degree of autonomy to allow particular groups to develop governance norms that are 
adapted to their needs,127 as well as constraints on autonomy in response to public values.128 This analysis, we 
believe, must explore how private intermediaries might be influenced to make decisions in ways that uphold the 
function of protecting rights and due process without the expense or rigidity of formal legal processes.129 
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